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The Alabama Court of the Judiciary should remove Roy Moore from 
the Supreme Court of Alabama for a second and final time.1  Over ten years 
after being ousted from the Alabama Supreme Court,2 Chief Justice Moore 
is embroiled in yet another controversy that involves disregarding the fed-
eral courts and creating chaos in the legal system.  Moore’s behavior, not to 
mention the ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte State of Al-
abama (Ex parte Alabama),3 is akin to a bad movie sequel that should have 
never been made and rightfully bombs at the box office. 
To be fair, Chief Justice Moore abstained in Ex parte Alabama, where 
the Alabama Supreme Court held, by an 8–1 margin that it was not bound 
by a federal district court’s decision invalidating Alabama’s same-sex mar-
riage ban, and that same-sex marriage bans did not violate the United States 
Constitution.4  To reach this result, the court took the extraordinary and rare 
step of exercising original jurisdiction, manufacturing standing by unilater-
ally realigning the parties, and issuing a writ of mandamus that prohibited 
probate judges throughout Alabama from issuing marriage licenses to 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. 
 1 See Ten Commandments Judge Removed from Office, CNN.COM (Nov. 14, 2003),  
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/13/moore.tencommandments/ (describing how, in 2003, 
Chief Justice Moore was ousted from the court for defying a federal court ruling ordering Moore 
to take down a monument of the Ten Commandments that he placed inside of the Alabama Judi-
cial Building). 
 2 Id. 
 3 No. 1140460, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015). 
 4 Id. at *148–49. 
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same-sex couples.5  The Court’s ruling ignored the fact that the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court had already de-
clined to review the case, and made no mention of the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will decide by June the fate of same-sex marriage bans na-
tionwide.  In other words, there was no justification whatsoever to issue the 
writ except to deny same-sex couples a right that thirty-seven states—and 
twenty-six state and federal courts—have already recognized.6  Put bluntly, 
the Alabama Supreme Court’s Houdini-esque reasoning made Griswold v. 
Connecticut7 and Roe v. Wade8  seem like an exercise in old school 
originalism9 and validated the claim that “judicial activism” is not a “liber-
al” phenomenon, but a reaction to “a decision you don’t like.”10 
Why did the Alabama Supreme Court go to all this trouble?  To keep on 
life support a law that twenty-six state and federal courts have held furthers 
no rational state interest whatsoever and that reflects unadulterated animus 
against same-sex couples.11  As discussed below, the primary arguments 
advanced in favor of restricting marriage to opposite sex couples—
procreation and child-rearing—are about as laughable as Roy Moore’s at-
tempt to defy a ruling by the federal courts in 2003, ordering Moore’s Ten 
Commandments Monument be removed from the Alabama Judicial Build-
ing.12  If anything, the Alabama Supreme Court’s recent decision harkens 
back to a dark period in Alabama’s history, when then-Governor George 
Wallace defied a federal court order in a symbolic attempt to stop desegre-
gation.13 
 
 5 Id. at *40 (“It is clear that no other court in this State has the jurisdiction to provide the relief 
necessary in this most unusual of cases.  There is a need for immediate, uniform relief among all 
the probate judges of this State, and no circuit court has jurisdiction over any probate judge out-
side its territorial jurisdiction.”). 
 6 See 37 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 13 States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 
PROCON.ORG (Mar. 4, 2015, 9:47:40 AM), http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?
resourceID=004857. 
 7 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a law prohibiting the use of contraception for the purpose of 
preventing conception). 
 8 410 U.S. 13 (1973) (holding the implied right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause encompassed a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before viability). 
 9 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Borkean Dilemma:  Robert Bork and the Tension Between Originalism 
and Democracy, 80 CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 243 (2013). 
 10 Cheryl K. Chumley, Sonia Sotomayor:  Judicial Activism is Not Real—It’s Called a Ruling You 
Don’t Like, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/3/
sonia-sotomayor-judicial-activisms-not-real-its-ca/. 
 11 See PROCON.ORG, supra note 6. 
 12 See Thou Shall Not Defy a Federal Court Order, COMMONWEALTH TIMES (Sept. 4, 2003), http://
www.commonwealthtimes.org/2003/09/04/thou-shall-not-defy-a-federal-court-order/. 
 13 See Alan Blinder, Judge Defies Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2015, at A1, available 
at  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/us/gay-marriage-set-to-begin-in-alabama-amid-
protest.html?_r=0 (stating that Chief Justice Moore’s conduct “has deep resonance in a place 
where a governor, George Wallace, stood in a doorway of the University of Alabama in 1963 in 
an unsuccessful bid to block its federally ordered integration”). 
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Technically, the Alabama Supreme Court did not err in disregarding the 
federal court’s order.14  However, the fact that it did so is troubling.  Even 
more troubling are the legal gymnastics that the court engaged in to achieve 
what even a casual observer knew would be a decision reaffirming tradi-
tional marriage.  Ironically, the court’s decision—and the legal jujitsu it 
employed—makes the best possible case for same-sex marriage.  Among 
other things, the decision threatens to disrupt the country’s delicate system 
of cooperative federalism, undermine the rule of law, and tar the judiciary 
with the taint of arbitrariness.15  Make no mistake:  this case is not about 
states’ rights.  It is about the integrity of the judicial system, which rises 
and falls on the public’s perception that judges are impartial and objective 
decision-makers, not self-interested actors who view the law as a vehicle to 
impose their policy predilections on citizens. 
Importantly, should the U.S. Supreme Court rule in favor of same-sex 
marriage, its decision should rest on equal protection principles, not a nebu-
lous and non-textual concept of liberty.16  Such reasoning will ground this 
right in the text, or at least a reasonable interpretation thereof, and mini-
mize the inevitable, albeit hollow, cries of ‘activism’ that will accompany 
such a decision.  After all, federal courts must intervene sometimes to pro-
tect the rule of law, preserve democratic governance, and safeguard equal 
rights, particularly when Alabama judges ignore a federal court ruling or 
decide to impose the death penalty despite a jury’s recommendation of life 
imprisonment.17 
In addition, Roy Moore should be removed from the Alabama Supreme 
Court for the second and last time.  Moore recently went so far as to sug-
gest that he would ignore the Supremacy Clause and not respect a U.S. Su-
 
 14 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Alabama’s Dangerous Definiance, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, 
at A29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/opinion/alabamas-dangerous-defiance.
html?_r=0 (“Because state and federal courts operate on entirely separate tracks, the state court’s 
position that it need not follow lower federal court rulings is technically correct.”). 
 15 See id. (“Yet if our judicial system is to function smoothly, both [state and federal] court systems 
must, from time to time, refrain from exercising their legal discretion . . . . If State Supreme 
Courts followed the Alabama Supreme Court’s lead, a system of dual courts simply would not 
work.”). 
 16 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”). 
 17 See, e.g., Page Williams, Double Jeopardy:  In Alabama, A Judge Can Override a Jury that 
Spares a Murderer from the Death Penalty, NEW YORKER, Nov. 17, 2014, available at  http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/17/double-jeopardy-3. 
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preme Court ruling in favor of same-sex marriage.18  That statement brings 
back memories of Governor Wallace’s infamous stand at the schoolhouse 
door.  At least Wallace had a change of heart later in life and distanced 
himself from his “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, and segregation 
forever” speech.19  Moore has not learned his lesson.  But he will soon, 
when the U.S. Supreme Court rules that same-sex marriage bans violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.  If, as Moore has suggested, he would not follow 
a ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of same-sex marriage, the Alabama 
Court of the Judiciary should dismiss him from the bench immediately.  
This article summarizes the Alabama Supreme Court’s 148-page decision 
and explains why it was motivated by politics and ideology, not law and 
justice.  The decision represents animus toward same-sex couples and a 
continuation of Alabama’s long history of drawing arbitrary classifications 
that enshrine discrimination into the law. 
I.  THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION CIRCUMVENTED 
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM 
By way of background, in Searcy v. Strange,20 the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Alabama held that Alabama’s same-sex 
marriage ban violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.21  Shortly after 
declaring the ban unconstitutional, a probate judge in Mobile, Alabama de-
nied a marriage license to a same-sex couple.22  In response, the district 
court entered a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Alabama Attorney 
General and “all his officers, agents, servants, and employees, and others in 
active concert or participation with any of them,”23 from enforcing the pro-
hibition on same-sex marriage. 
Alabama’s probate judges, however, believed that they were obligated 
to enforce Alabama state law.24  In a subsequent order, the district court 
acknowledged that the probate judges were not technically obligated to fol-
low the ruling, but noted that if clerks of court declined to follow the rul-
 
 18 See Jeremy Diamond, Chief Alabama Judge Would Defy Supreme Court in Gay Marriage Rul-
ing, CNN.COM (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/ray-moore-alabama-
gay-marraige-supreme-court-slavery/. 
 19 Carl T. Rowan, The Rehabilitation of George Wallace, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A21, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/sept98/wallace090591.htm. 
 20 No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7776 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015). 
 21 See id.; see also Judgment Entry for the Plaintiffs, Searcy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7776, availa-
ble at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00208/pdf/USCOURTS-alsd-1_
14-cv-00208-4.pdf (holding that Alabama’s same-sex marriage ban violated the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 22 See Ex parte Alabama, No. 1140460, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *8 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015). 
 23 Id. at *5. 
 24 Id. 
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ing, another injunction would be issued.25  The district court stayed the ini-
tial order pending the Attorney General’s appeal to the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.26  Both courts de-
clined to hear the case, prompting the district court to lift the stay.27  One 
day before the stay was lifted, Chief Justice Roy Moore entered an order, 
stating that the district court’s order and injunction were not binding on 
probate judges and prohibiting probate judges from issuing same-sex mar-
riage licenses.28 
Thereafter, the Alabama Policy Institute and Alabama Citizens Action 
Program filed a petition with the Alabama Supreme Court seeking a writ of 
mandamus to prohibit Alabama’s probate judges from issuing marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples.29  The Alabama Supreme Court ordered brief-
ing, including on the issues of whether the court had subject matter juris-
diction and whether the plaintiffs had standing.30  The court also realigned 
one of the parties—a probate judge—who had refused to issue a same-sex 
marriage license, and collectively referred to the plaintiffs as relators.31  
The relators argued that Alabama probate judges have a ministerial duty to 
comply with Alabama law, thus rendering the district court’s order unen-
forceable against those judges.  The respondents—probate judges who had 
followed the district court’s order—argued that the writ should not be is-
sued because it would require the Alabama Supreme Court to determine 
whether the same-sex marriage ban violated the United States Constitution, 
a matter over which the court did not have jurisdiction.32 
The Alabama Supreme Court disagreed and issued the writ.  To achieve 
this result, the court made the extraordinary decision to exercise original 
jurisdiction, bypassing the typical requirement that cases proceed through 
the lower state courts before undergoing review by the Alabama Supreme 
Court.33  The court’s reasoning was based on the well-settled, but rarely in-
voked, principle that state courts do not have to follow lower federal court 
orders, and are only bound by decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court.34  The court was technically correct, but it made no sense for the 
court to exercise jurisdiction because, among other things, the U.S. Su-
 
 25 Id. at *6. 
 26 Id. at *7. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *7. 
 29 Id. at *9. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at *10. 
 32 Id. at *13. 
 33 Id. at *152 (Shaw, J., dissenting). 
 34 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *80–81. 
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preme Court had already granted certiorari in DeBoer v. Snyder35 and will 
determine the fate of same-sex marriage bans within months. 
Upon granting original jurisdiction, the court reviewed the case on an 
expedited basis and predictably held that probate judges’ ministerial duties 
are governed by Alabama law, which may be superseded only by the Unit-
ed States Constitution.36  Since bans on same-sex marriage did not, in the 
court’s view, violate the Constitution, probate judges were not permitted to 
issue marriage licenses to same sex couples.37  As discussed below, the 
court’s reasoning was hopelessly flawed regarding:  (1) the exercise of 
original jurisdiction; (2) the determination that the relators had standing; 
and (3) the decision that same-sex marriage bans did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
A. The Court’s Decision to Exercise Original Jurisdiction Threatens to 
Undermine Principles of Federalism 
The Alabama Supreme Court invoked Section 140(b) of the Alabama Con-
stitution, which states that the Supreme Court “shall have original jurisdic-
tion . . . to issue such remedial writs or orders as may be necessary to give 
it general supervision and control of courts of inferior jurisdiction.”38  The 
court acknowledged that the writ is only used “in extreme cases and under 
unusual circumstances,”39 and where “justice cannot otherwise be done,”40 
but deemed this case sufficiently exigent to justify its issuance.  The Court 
noted that throughout history, marriage had been defined as the union of a 
man and a woman, and that redefining marriage to include opposite-sex 
couples would result in a seismic shift in Alabama law.41  In so holding, the 
court relied heavily on its decision in Ex parte Alabama Textile Products 
Corp.,42 where it exercised original jurisdiction because the lower state 
court did not have the power to provide sufficient relief “in time to prevent 
the consummation of the alleged wrong.”43 
Justice Greg Shaw, the lone dissenter, exposed the infirmities in this 
reasoning.  Shaw explained that the statutory scheme, which permitted 
“remedial and individual writs as are necessary to give to it [the Alabama 
Supreme Court] a general superintendence and control of courts of inferior 
 
 35 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 36 See Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *13. 
 37 Id. at *115–117. 
 38 Id. at *30; see also ALA. CODE §12-2-7 (3) (2015) (authorizing various writs, including manda-
mus). 
 39 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *35 (citations omitted). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Ex parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 7 So. 2d 303, 306 (1942). 
 43 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *35 (quoting Alabama Textile, 7 So. 2d at 306). 
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jurisdiction.”44  The power to issue original writs, however, does not en-
compass original jurisdiction, but instead refers to writs that “review inter-
locutory decisions of the lower courts.”45  As Justice Shaw explained, this 
approach was consistent with the Alabama Supreme Court’s common prac-
tice to hear petitions “challenging a lower court’s decision in a pending 
case.”46  Since the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court had already 
declined to hear this matter, the district court’s order was final and prohib-
ited the court from exercising original jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, “[a]dvising a probate judge how to issue government mar-
riage licenses is not ‘superintendence and control’ of an inferior court’s 
performance of a judicial function,”47 but rather “instructing a State official 
acting in a nonjudicial capacity.”48  Simply put, “the [probate] court has no 
judicial power to issue a marriage license,”49 but instead is something that 
“the legislature has instructed that probate judges ‘may’ do.”50  As a result, 
Alabama Textile was distinguishable because it held that the Supreme 
Court could “supervise persons and bodies clothed with judicial power”51 
and review the judicial action “of an inferior tribunal vested with judicial or 
quasi-judicial power.”52  Consequently, Alabama Textile did not provide 
the Alabama Supreme Court with “original jurisdiction to review the non-
judicial functions of probate judges.”53 
Alabama Textile is distinguishable for another reason:  the United 
States Supreme Court had not already granted certiorari to pass on the iden-
tical question that, in Ex parte Alabama, the Alabama Supreme Court 
deemed worthy of original jurisdiction.  It made no sense for the Alabama 
Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction because the U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision will—within months—fully resolve the question and, depending on 
the result, redress any perceived harm that would result from issuing same-
sex marriage licenses.  If the Supreme Court invalidates same-sex marriage 
bans nationwide, then Alabama will be in the same position as when the 
federal district court issued its order, except that this time the Supremacy 
Clause will, absent a revolt by Chief Justice Roy Moore, prohibit Alabama 
from disregarding federal law.54  If the Supreme Court holds that states 
 
 44 Id. at *152 (Shaw, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id. at *139. 
 48 Id. (emphasis added). 
 49 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *139. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at *155 (emphasis removed). 
 52 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 53 Id. (emphasis added). 
 54 See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be 
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need not recognize same-sex marriage, then all marriage licenses that were 
issued after the district court’s ruling, but before the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion will be null and void.  As such, the Alabama Supreme Court’s writ 
does nothing but preserve the status quo until a higher court tells Alabama 
what it must do or can lawfully undo. 
Simply put, the justification for issuing a writ of mandamus was any-
thing but extraordinary.  This is not a situation where “for special reasons 
complete justice cannot otherwise be done,”55 or where intervention is nec-
essary to prevent “a denial of justice.”56  If anything, a denial of justice is 
precisely what it causes.  The court’s decision denies to same-sex couples a 
right that state and federal courts across the country have recognized, and 
that the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court, in refusing to review the 
case, suggests is imminent. 
B. The Court Manufactured Standing Because No Citizens Were Actually 
Harmed by the District Court’s Ruling 
To “afford full relief and do complete justice,”57 the Alabama Supreme 
Court was required to consider the constitutionality of same-sex marriage 
bans.  The obvious question is, who was harmed by the district court’s de-
cision?  Children?  Opposite-sex couples?  Alabama’s understanding of 
state sovereignty?  After all, the Alabama Supreme Court had no authority 
to hear this case unless a party could show that it had standing to challenge 
the district court’s decision. 
The standing doctrine requires a litigant to demonstrate an actual, con-
crete, and particularized injury, a causal connection between the injury and 
alleged wrongful conduct, and the likelihood that the injury will be re-
dressed by a favorable decision.58  Even though Alabama law is co-
extensive with federal standing doctrine,59 the Alabama Supreme Court 
managed to wiggle out of this problem by relying on a case from Indiana 
that invoked the “public standing doctrine,” a seldom-used exception to the 
standing requirement.60  This doctrine applies when public rather than pri-
vate rights are at issue, and does not require the litigant to demonstrate an 
actual injury or an interest that differs from the general public.61  Given that 
 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.”). 
 55 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *40. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at *42. 
 58 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 59 See Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *45 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
 60 See id. at *48 (quoting State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E. 978, 983 (Ind. 
2003)). 
 61 See id. at *47. 
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the court had unilaterally realigned the parties to include as a plaintiff a 
probate judge who had refused to issue same-sex marriage licenses, the 
court was able to conclude both that standing existed and that the manda-
mus was warranted to “procure the enforcement of a public duty.”62  The 
court also relied on the related concept of “public interest standing,” which 
allows courts to issue writs of mandamus “in matters of great public inter-
est . . . to compel an officer to do his or her duty.”63  In such cases, the “on-
ly interest necessary is that of the people at large.”64 
Once again, the dissent exposed the flaws in this reasoning.  Justice 
Shaw explained that, although “citizens can sometimes sue in the name of 
the State to compel a public officer to perform a legal duty in which the 
public has an interest,”65 they cannot do so when the issue relates to “the 
sovereign rights of the State.”66  Undoubtedly, the authority of Alabama to 
limit the definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples implicated its sov-
ereign powers, and, therefore, barred citizens from suing on the state’s be-
half.  The Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary prompted 
the dissent to state that “[t]his Court is applying a different rule in this 
case.”67  Indeed, if the typical standing requirements had applied—as they 
should have—none of the parties would have had standing.  The relators 
did not suffer an injury “in a personal and individual way”68 that distin-
guished them from members of the public who shared their views about 
same-sex marriage.  Of course, the fact that the court had to go to such 
great lengths—adding a plaintiff and relying on a rarely used exception to 
the typical standing requirements—shows how desperate the court was to 
prevent same-sex couples from marrying. 
Furthermore, the notion that there was an urgent public interest in en-
forcing a public duty rested on the assumption that same-sex marriage was 
a threat to the public interest, and that the district court’s order did not cre-
ate a new duty requiring probate judges to issue same-sex marriages, par-
ticularly after the Eleventh Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court denied Ala-
bama’s appeals.  Perhaps most telling was that the Alabama Supreme Court 
had to distinguish its own precedent, which established that, where the sov-
ereign rights of the state are implicated, writs of mandamus can only issue 
if the Attorney General, not a probate judge, is the relator.69  The only ex-
ception to this rule is where another public official has an interest that is 
 
 62 Id. at *48 (quoting State ex rel. Cittadine, 790 N.E. at 983). 
 63 Id. at *49. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *148 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison v. 
Morris, 141 So. 2d 169, 170 (Ala. 1962)). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at *148 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). 
 69 See Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel. Williams, 42 So. 2d 24, 27 (Ala. 1949). 
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“peculiar” and thus different from the Attorney General, such that standing 
would be justified.  The Alabama Supreme Court held that the probate 
judge had a “peculiar interest”70 because the judge was directly responsible 
for issuing same-sex marriage licenses, although it held earlier in the opin-
ion that the probate judges’ interest was no different than the general pub-
lic.  This is a textbook example of manipulating the law to achieve a preor-
dained outcome. 
C.  The Court’s Rationale for Upholding Same-Sex Marriage Bans—
Procreation and Child Rearing—Are Meritless 
1. The Court Unwisely Disregarded the Federal District Court’s 
Order 
The Alabama Supreme Court relied on the principle that “state courts 
may interpret the United States Constitution independently from, and even 
contrary to, federal courts.”71  The court emphasized that “we defer only to 
the holdings of the United States Supreme Court and our own interpreta-
tions of federal law.”72  Consequently, the federal district court’s order was 
binding only if the Alabama Supreme Court agreed with its conclusion that 
same-sex marriage bans violated the United States Constitution.  As dis-
cussed below, the Alabama Supreme Court’s answer to that question was 
certainly no. 
The court was technically correct that state courts are not bound by the 
decisions of federal district courts or circuit courts of appeals.  In the sub-
stantial majority of cases, however, state courts will adhere to federal court 
rulings, particularly where such rulings are affirmed (or review is denied) 
by the circuit court of appeals and certiorari is denied by the United States 
Supreme Court.73  This is precisely what the Alabama Supreme Court 
should have done, particularly because, as the dissent noted, the plaintiffs 
“have not asked this Court to rule on the constitutionality of Alabama’s 
marriage-protection laws.”74 
To depart from this practice and exercise original jurisdiction for this 
decision, creates chaos.  Imagine if the Alabama Supreme Court’s view of 
 
 70 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *73. 
 71 Id. at *76. 
 72 Id.  (citing Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 589 So. 2d 165, 167 n.2 (Ala. 1991) (holding 
that only decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding on state courts). 
 73 See generally, Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex:  Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal 
Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015) (discussing the 
problems that would result if state courts frequently refused to follow decisions of the lower fed-
eral courts). 
 74 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *150 (Shaw, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional federalism were followed by all states.  It would mean that 
no decision from a federal district court or circuit court of appeals would be 
binding on a state.  Since the U.S. Supreme Court only hears a tiny fraction 
of cases each year, Alabama’s approach would, as a practical matter, give 
the states authority to ignore rights deemed fundamental by federal district 
and appellate courts under the U.S. Constitution.  As such, absent the U.S. 
Supreme Court or Congress’s recognition of a fundamental right, each 
state’s constitution, and interpretations thereof by state court judges, would 
be equal, if not superior, to the federal Constitution and give states nearly 
unchecked authority to create or disparage fundamental rights.  This would 
reduce the Supremacy Clause to a legal fiction, tremendous incongruity re-
garding the nature and scope of fundamental rights would result, and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause would be written out of existence.  The incor-
poration doctrine would mean very little because, in most cases, state 
courts would have sole authority to interpret the federal Constitution and 
thereby define rights and powers in any manner they pleased. 
For example, the Supreme Court of States A and B could arrive at op-
posite conclusions regarding whether the “separate but equal” doctrine vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause.  This would not only subject African 
Americans to state-sanctioned discrimination, but it would force some Af-
rican Americans to flee the state to escape segregation.  The only remedy 
for African Americans would be through the U.S. Supreme Court because 
the political and democratic process in states that adopt “separate but 
equal” would be all but non-existent for African Americans.  Perhaps the 
Supreme Court or Congress would intervene in such a case, but neither the 
Court nor Congress would be able to repair the myriad ways in which states 
might interpret either the federal or state constitutions to deny basic free-
doms that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”75 
The practical effect is that the Ninth Amendment, which states that the 
Constitution should not be interpreted to deny or disparage other rights re-
tained by the people,76 would be a near-nullity.  Some states, like Alabama, 
could refuse to recognize any rights other than those contained in the Bill 
of Rights, and construe the Bill of Rights so narrowly that basic freedoms 
attendant to those rights would be denied.  The point, of course, is that the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction is entirely in-
consistent with our constitutional scheme because it undermines principles 
of cooperative federalism governance.  It results in an unworkable and un-
reasonably narrow interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, and gives states 
 
 75 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted) (holding the 
right to assisted suicide was not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
 76 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
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the right to nullify the rulings of all federal courts but one.  That is not a 
prescription for states’ rights or state sovereignty.  It is an indirect way of 
circumventing express and implied rights, particularly those that are not 
enumerated. 
The greatest irony of Alabama’s approach is that it may actually lead to 
more control by the federal government.  If Alabama’s model prevailed 
across the country, Congress might act more aggressively to pass legisla-
tion exerting broad control in various areas of governance, and the Su-
preme Court might not only defer to such legislation, but may also create 
broad and categorical rules guaranteeing positive and negative rights 
against arbitrary deprivation by the state.   
Also, it would throw the concept of citizenry, and the relationship be-
tween states and the federal government, into turmoil.  For example, if fed-
eral courts recognized a right to pre-viability abortion, but some states did 
not, then citizens living in a state that prohibited abortion would possess the 
right in name only.  In this way, state and federal citizenry would no longer 
be co-extensive, as state citizenry would deprive citizens of the actual en-
joyment of those rights.  Put differently, individuals would no longer be cit-
izens of the several states or even of the United States. 
2. The Interests in Procreation and Child Rearing Do Not Justify 
Same-Sex Marriage Bans 
The Alabama Supreme Court relied on the state’s interest in procreation 
and child rearing to hold that same-sex marriage bans further rational state 
interests, even though dozens of federal and state courts have exposed the 
fallacies in this argument.  To begin with, the court held that same-sex mar-
riage bans are not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny because sexual 
orientation is not a suspect class.77  Additionally, the Court rejected the 
proposition that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of gen-
der because “[a]ll men and women are equally entitled to enter the institu-
tion of marriage.”78  A similar argument was made in Loving v. Virginia,79 
where the United States Supreme Court invalidated state bans on interracial 
marriage.80  In that case, attorneys for the state of Virginia argued that the 
ban did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the ban applied 
equally to citizens of all races.81  The problem, of course, was that the ban 
was motivated by animus against African Americans, just like same-sex 
marriage bans are motivated by animus toward homosexuals. 
 
 77 See Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *94. 
 78 Id. at *94–95 . 
 79 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 80 Id. at 12 (explaining that the freedom to marry violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 81 Id. at 10. 
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The Alabama Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Loving on the 
grounds that the decision retains the traditional definition of marriage, and 
“was not referring to an institution that formally recognized homosexual 
relationships.”82  However, the question in Loving was whether bans on in-
terracial marriage impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race, not 
whether the institution  of marriage should be redefined.  To distinguish 
Loving on that basis is to misapprehend its core holding:  laws driven by 
prejudice or animus toward a particular group constitute invidious discrim-
ination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Notwithstanding, the 
Alabama Supreme Court held that the highly deferential rational basis 
standard applied, and concluded that same-sex marriage bans were rational-
ly related to the legitimate state objectives in procreation and child rearing. 
The Court held that same-sex marriage could not be deemed a funda-
mental right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause be-
cause it was not “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.”83  
The Court explained that heterosexual marriage “is a right of privacy older 
than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our 
school system.”84  Moreover, cases throughout history have considered 
marriage only in the context of opposite-sex couples, whereas same-sex 
marriage is a relatively “new notion” that was not permitted by any state 
until the twenty-first century.85 
Simply put, “[m]en and women complement each other biologically 
and socially,”86 in that “the sexual union between man and woman (often) 
produces children.”87  For this reason, heterosexual marriage has “more to 
do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution”88 
and was created for the purpose of “produc[ing] . . . upright, decent peo-
ple . . . [who] benefit from the love and care of both mother and father.”89  
In doing so, heterosexual marriage “creates the family” and “provides the 
optimum environment for defining the responsibilities of parents and for 
raising children to be productive members of society.”90 
 
 82 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *99.  The Court also relied on Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), which held that it was permissible to limit the definition of marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case for 
“want of a substantial federal question.”  See  id., cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 83 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *100 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 434 
U.S. 494 (1977)). 
 84 Id. at *97 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
 85 Id. at *99 (quoting Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 391 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
 86 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *115. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at *15 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)). 
 89 Id. at *17. 
 90 Id. at *116. 
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Consequently, permitting same-sex marriage would undermine “the 
fundamental unit of society,”91 which is to promote “stability and wel-
fare . . . [and] the general good of the public.”92 
The problem with the Court’s reliance on the procreation and child rear-
ing rationales is that these objectives are furthered, not undermined, by 
permitting same-sex marriage.  In fact, both of these rationales have been 
thoroughly and convincingly debunked by a number of state and federal 
courts. 
a. The Procreation and Child Rearing Arguments Are Fallacious 
Numerous federal and state courts have rejected the argument that 
same-sex marriage bans further the state’s interest in procreation and child 
rearing.  For example, in Baskin v. Bogan,93 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit joined three other federal appeals courts and invalidated 
same-sex marriage bans in Indiana and Wisconsin.94  Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Richard Posner held that the procreation argument lacked merit 
because the ability to procreate was never a prerequisite to receiving a mar-
riage license.95  Judge Posner noted that, “if channeling procreative sex into 
marriage were the only reason that Indiana recognizes marriage, the state 
would not allow an infertile person to marry.”96  Posner stated as follows: 
Indeed it would make marriage licenses expire when one of the spouses 
(fertile upon marriage) became infertile because of age or disease.  The state 
treats married homosexuals as would-be “free riders” on heterosexual marriage, 
unreasonably reaping benefits intended by the state for fertile couples.  But in-
fertile couples are free riders too. Why are they allowed to reap the benefits ac-
corded marriages of fertile couples, and homosexuals are not?97 
Also, Indiana law permitted “marriages of close relatives for first cous-
ins 65 or older—a population guaranteed to be infertile because women 
can’t conceive at that age.”98  Judge Posner stated: 
If the state’s only interest in allowing marriage is to protect children, why has it 
gone out of its way to permit marriage of first cousins only after they are prov-
ably infertile?  The state must think marriage valuable for something other than 
just procreation—that even non-procreative couples benefit from marriage.  
And among non-procreative couples, those that raise children, such as same-
 
 91 Id. at *14. 
 92 Id. at *17. 
 93 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (funda-
mental rights); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (animus, fundamental rights, suspect 
classification); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (fundamental rights); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (fundamental rights). 
 94 766 F.3d at 762. 
 95 Id. at 661 (noting that Indiana does not prevent an infertile person from marrying). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 662. 
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sex couples with adopted children, gain more from marriage than those who do 
not raise children, such as elderly cousins; elderly persons rarely adopt.99 
As a result, Indiana creates “an insidious form of discrimination:  favor-
ing first cousins, provided they are not of the same sex, over homosexu-
als.”100  To be sure, “[e]lderly first cousins are permitted to marry because 
they can’t produce children; homosexuals are forbidden to marry because 
they can’t produce children.”101  The infirmities in the state’s argument re-
vealed that the procreation argument was “impossible to take seriously.”102 
Judge Posner also rejected the argument that, when opposite-sex cou-
ples have intercourse, a child may result, whereas same-sex couples can 
never produce children.103  Sterile and elderly couples are allowed to marry.  
As Posner stated, “[h]eterosexuals get drunk and pregnant, producing un-
wanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry,”104 while 
“[h]omosexual couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward is 
to be denied the right to marry.”105  Ultimately, as one scholar notes, the 
operative question “is whether a society that allows same-sex marriage is 
less apt to procreate than a society that prohibits it.  Almost certainly, the 
answer is ‘no.’”106 
b.Same-Sex Marriage Bans Harm, Rather than Protect, Children 
Judge Posner rejected the state’s argument that marriage is intended to 
provide children with a stable and nurturing environment.  Since Indiana 
expressly allows homosexual couples to adopt children,107 such bans actu-
ally undermine this interest because adopted children of same-sex couples 
will always be raised by unmarried couples: 
If the fact that a child’s parents are married enhances the child’s prospects for a 
happy and successful life, as Indiana believes not without reason, this should be 
true whether the child’s parents are natural or adoptive.  The state’s lawyers tell 
us that “the point of marriage’s associated benefits and protections is to en-
courage child-rearing environments where parents care for their biological 
children in tandem.”  Why the qualifier “biological”?  The state recognizes that 
family is about raising children and not just about producing them.  It does not 
explain why the “point of marriage’s associated benefits and protections” is in-
applicable to a couple’s adopted as distinct from biological children.108 
 
 99 Id. 






106 Gary J. Simson, Religion By Any Other Name? Prohibitions on Same-Sex Marriage and the Lim-
its of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 132, 154 (2012) (emphasis added). 
107 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 664. 
108 Id. at 663. 
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Moreover, since “[m]arried homosexuals are more likely to want to adopt 
than unmarried ones if only because of the many state and federal benefits 
to which married couples are entitled,”109 the state actually had an interest 
in legalizing, not prohibiting, same-sex marriage.  Thus, the “more willing 
adopters there are, not only the fewer children there will be in foster care or 
being raised by single mothers but also the fewer abortions there will 
be,”110 because some women mistakenly believe that their “only option is to 
kill [their] preborn child.”111  Furthermore, “[i]f marriage is better for chil-
dren who are being brought up by their biological parents, it must be better 
for children who are being brought up by their adoptive parents.”112  Since 
Indiana permits joint adoption by homosexual couples, it should 
“want homosexual couples who adopt children . . . to be married.”113  After 
all, if the state were truly interested in protecting children, it would 
strengthen all relationships where couples have children. 
3. Morality and Religion Are Not Valid State Interests 
In Lawrence v. Texas,114 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Texas 
statute banning sodomy among same-sex couples only, holding that it vio-
lated the substantive guarantee of liberty and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.115  Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy held that, although “powerful voices . . . condemn homosexual con-
duct as immoral,” the state may not “enforce these views on the whole so-
ciety through operation of the criminal law.”116  As Justice Kennedy stated, 
“[o]ur job is to define the liberty of all, not mandate our own moral 
code.”117  Justice Kennedy based his decision on principles of privacy and 
liberty, holding that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection 
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, fami-
ly relationships, child rearing, and education.”118 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of lib-
erty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 




111 Id. (emphasis in original). 
112 Id. at 664. 
113 Id. (emphasis in original). 
114 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
115 Id. at 578. 
116 Id. at 571. 
117 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
118 Id. at 573–74 (citation omitted). 
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not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State. 119 
Thus, “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for 
these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”120  Indeed, “[w]hen homo-
sexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in 
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimina-
tion both in the public and in the private spheres.”121  In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor premised her decision on equal protec-
tion principles, holding that the statute was invalid because it prohibited 
sodomy only among same-sex couples.122  This treats the same conduct dif-
ferently based solely on the participants, thus making “homosexuals une-
qual in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that 
conduct—subject to criminal sanction.”123 
Likewise, in United States v. Windsor,124 the Supreme Court invalidated 
Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act, which limited the definition 
of marriage to opposite-sex couples and therefore withheld federal benefits 
from same-sex couples.125  Again writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
shifted his emphasis to equal protection principles, stating that “the Consti-
tution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare con-
gressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify dis-
parate treatment of that group.”126   ”The avowed purpose and practical 
effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate 
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages . . . .”127  
In so holding, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed the notion that “both moral dis-
approval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality bet-
ter comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian morality)” are 
both are impermissible bases upon which to justify discriminatory treat-
ment.128 
The Alabama Supreme Court distinguished Lawrence by holding that 
same-sex marriage involves “public state-governmental approval of their 
relationships,”129 whereas Lawrence merely stood for the proposition that 
the government does not have a legitimate interest in interfering with pri-
vate, consensual conduct.  Likewise, the Court distinguished Windsor on 
 
119 Id. at 574 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 575. 
122 Id. at 580–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
123 Id. at 581. 
124 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
125 Id. at 2683. 
126 Id. at 2693 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)). 
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128 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Ex parte Alabama, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, at *112. 
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the ground that the U.S. Supreme Court’s reliance on the “equal dignity” of 
homosexuals had no textual basis in the Constitution.130  Furthermore, 
Windsor’s conclusion that married couples have more dignity under the law 
than unmarried couples was a moral, not legal, assessment, and “not con-
tained in the Constitution.”131  Moreover, the Court’s reliance on “equal 
dignity” was suspect because it was “not based on religion.”132  One must 
wonder from this statement whether the Alabama Supreme Court would 
ignore a Supreme Court holding in favor of same-sex marriage for precise-
ly these reasons. 
Tellingly, the Alabama Supreme Court made no attempt to distinguish 
the myriad rulings from other state and federal courts that have rejected the 
procreation and child-rearing rationales. And for good reason:  they cannot.  
The Sixth Circuit attempted to do so, but its reasoning was equally flawed. 
D.  Same-Sex Marriage Should Not Be Left to the Democratic Process 
In DeBoer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit be-
came the first federal appeals court to hold that same-sex marriage bans did 
not violate the Constitution.  Although the Court held that bans on same-
sex marriage furthered the rational state interest in procreation,133 it focused 
more on allowing the People to resolve this matter through the democratic 
process.  With respect to procreation, the Sixth Circuit stated as follows: 
By creating a status (marriage) and by subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privi-
leges and deductions), the States created an incentive for two people who pro-
create together to stay together for purposes of rearing offspring. That does not 
convict the States of irrationality, only of awareness of the biological reality 
that couples of the same sex do not have children in the same way as couples of 
opposite sexes and that couples of the same sex do not run the risk of unintend-
ed offspring. That explanation, still relevant today, suffices to allow the States 
to retain authority over an issue they have regulated from the beginning.134 
 
130 Id. at *133–34. 
131 Id. at *139.  The Court also held that an open question existed regarding whether Windsor ap-
plied only to those states that had made the decision to recognize same-sex marriage.  Id. at *144. 
132 Id. at *138. 
133 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014).  The Court held that same-sex mar-
riage bans were rationally-related to two governmental interests: 
One starts from the premise that governments got into the business of defining marriage, 
and remain in the business of defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate sex, 
most especially the intended and unintended effects of male-female intercourse.  Imagine 
a society without marriage. It does not take long to envision problems that might result 
from an absence of rules about how to handle the natural effects of male-female inter-
course:  children.  May men and women follow their procreative urges wherever they 
take them?  Who is responsible for the children that result?  How many mates may an in-
dividual have?  How does one decide which set of mates is responsible for which set of 
children?  That we rarely think about these questions nowadays shows only how far we 
have come and how relatively stable our society is, not that States have no explanation 
for creating such rules in the first place. 
134 Id. at 405–06. 
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Given that there was at least a plausible basis to justify same-sex mar-
riage bans, the best manner in which to resolve this issue was through the 
democratic process. In the Court’s view, “if a federal court denies the peo-
ple suffrage over an issue long thought to be within their power, they de-
serve an explanation . . . [w]e, for our part, cannot find one.”135  To be sure, 
“[n]ot one of the plaintiffs’ theories, however, makes the case for constitu-
tionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the 
place it has been since the founding:  in the hands of state voters.”136 
What is more, the Fourteenth Amendment’s broadly phrased language 
made it unwise to hold that same-sex marriage was not a right expressly 
contained in or inferable from the text.  In the court’s view, few would ar-
gue that the “people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment understood it 
to require the States to change the definition of marriage.”137  Since the def-
inition of marriage has always been understood as the union of opposite sex 
couples, marriage laws should remain in force “until the democratic pro-
cesses say they should stand no more.”138 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that there are strong argu-
ments in favor of recognizing same-sex marriage, but none were of suffi-
cient importance to compel the conclusion that “one must look at this poli-
cy issue in just one way on pain of violating the Constitution.”139  In fact, 
one of the “key insights of federalism is that it permits laboratories of ex-
perimentation—accent on the plural—allowing one State to innovate one 
way, another State another, and a third State to assess the trial and error 
over time.”140 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning has superficial appeal, but on closer anal-
ysis fails because democracy does not give states or the people the right to 
enact or to continue enforcing laws that violate the Constitution, or that the 
U.S. Supreme Court is likely to deem unconstitutional.  If the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision were taken to its logical extreme, then states would be given 
sweeping power to enact laws provided that they could demonstrate more 
than “just one way” of viewing the law’s constitutionality.  This would turn 
constitutional law on its head because the question is not whether a law 
may be considered constitutional, but instead whether there is any basis up-
on which to conclude that, on its face or as applied, it is unconstitutional.  
In a stinging dissent, Judge Daughtrey wrote “[i]f we in the judiciary do not 
have the authority, and . . . the responsibility, to right fundamental wrongs 
left excused by a majority of the electorate, our whole intricate, constitu-
 
135 Id. at 402. 
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139 Id. at 405. 
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tional system of checks and balances, as well as the oaths to which we 
swore, prove to be nothing but shams.”141 
For the reasons stated above, and for those stated by twenty-six state 
and federal courts, same-sex marriage bans violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The state’s interest in procreation is certainly a legitimate one, but 
same-sex marriage bans do not further, and same-sex marriage does not 
undermine, that interest.  Giving same-sex couples the right to marry does 
not mean that heterosexual couples who have the ability and desire to pro-
create will suddenly decide to forego childbirth. In addition, permitting 
same-sex marriage will provide children of same-sex couples with a stable 
home and family environment that enjoys the same social and economic 
benefits as opposite-sex couples. In other words, as the Windsor Court 
held, same-sex couples will have equal dignity under the law, not be rele-
gated to “second tier” marriages just as the separate but equal doctrine rel-
egated African Americans to second-class citizenship.142 
The dissenting opinion made precisely this point.  Opponents of same-
sex marriage bans “ignore the destabilizing effect of its [marriage’s] ab-
sence in the homes of tens of thousands of same-sex parents throughout the 
four states of the Sixth Circuit.”143  Knowing that these bans stigmatize 
homosexual relationships and invariably harm the children of those rela-
tionships, Alabama’s continued enforcement of them reveals an underlying 
motive that has nothing to do with protecting the welfare of children:  ani-
mus toward homosexuals. 
III.  ROY MOORE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE ALABAMA SUPREME 
COURT AGAIN 
To be clear, people who oppose same-sex marriage bans often do so be-
cause of deeply held religious beliefs.  They are not bad people and certain-
ly should not be called bigots.  What Chief Justice Moore is doing, howev-
er, is worthy of neither respect nor tolerance.  Moore has done great 
damage to the rule of law, the Alabama Supreme Court, and the people of 
Alabama.  And Chief Justice Moore has not been shy about expressing his 
view on homosexuality, particularly in his opinions as a member of the Al-
abama Supreme Court. 
For example, in Ex parte H.H.,144 decided one year before he was dis-
charged from the bench, Moore wrote that the State has “the power to pro-
hibit conduct with physical penalties, such as confinement and even execu-
 
141 Id. at 436–37 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
142 See Windsor, 134 S. Ct. at 2694 (“[DOMA] places same-sex couples in an unstable position of 
being in a second-tier marriage.”). 
143 DeBoer, 772 F. 3d at 422 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
144 830 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002). 
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tion,” and “must use that power to prevent the subversion of children to-
ward this lifestyle [homosexuality], to not encourage a criminal life-
style.”145  Moore went so far as to describe homosexuality as “an act of 
sexual misconduct punishable as a crime in Alabama, a crime against na-
ture, an inherent evil, and an act so heinous that it defies one’s ability to de-
scribe it.”146 
The problem is not that Moore harbors these views, although many 
would find them to be patently offensive.  The problem is that Moore’s re-
ligious beliefs dominate his legal philosophy, his jurisprudence, and his 
conception of equal rights to such an extent that he is willing to create a 
constitutional crisis in the name of Christianity.  Moore’s words in Ex parte 
H.H. embrace precisely what the Alabama Supreme Court found problem-
atic in Windsor:  they represent moral, not legal judgments, and they reflect 
prejudice, not principle. 
CONCLUSION 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Shaw refused to address the issue of 
whether the district court’s decision was correct.147  In doing so, Justice 
Shaw understood that personal ideology should not trump a court’s obliga-
tion to remain faithful to the rule of law and to the orderly administration of 
justice.  That is precisely where Roy Moore—and the rest of the Alabama 
Supreme Court—got it wrong.  They allowed their personal beliefs—and 
animus toward homosexuals—to engineer a startlingly dishonest interpreta-
tion of the law and a disheartening attack against same-sex couples. 
Judge Shaw criticized the majority for its manipulation of the law and 
for the “unforeseen consequences [that will occur] in future cases.”148  The 
immediate consequences for same-sex couples are as troubling as the un-
foreseen consequences to the integrity of our judicial system.  Same-sex 
marriage does not harm children, the institution of marriage, or opposite-
sex couples’ ability to procreate.  It reflects the basic principle that, absent 
legitimate government interests, every citizen is entitled to be treated equal-
ly under the law and to fully enjoy the rights and protections enumerated in 
the Constitution. When court rulings compromise that core value, they 
threaten the liberty and equal dignity guaranteed to every citizen.  Put 
simply, “[t]rue freedom requires the rule of law and justice, and a judicial 
system in which the rights of some are not secured by the denial of rights to 
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others.”149  For that reason, the United States Supreme Court should hold 
that same-sex marriage bans violate the Equal Protection Clause, and put 
another nail in the coffin of discrimination and inequality. 
 
149 Chief Rabbi Lord Sacks, Passover Tells Us: Treat Your Children Well (Apr. 17, 2011), available 
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chief-rabbi-lord-sacks/passover-message-for-
huff_b_849623.html. 
